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FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING AND
ARTICLE 41-ANOTHER BLOW TO
THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT?
Jerome B. Elkind*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the 23rd of July 1973, at 9:00 a.m. New Zealand time, members of the crew of the New Zealand vessel, Otago, witnessed a
nuclear explosion on one of the islands in the Mururoa atoll.' The
blast, a small one in the low kiloton range, marked the beginning
of the eighth series of French atmospheric nuclear tests, which
have been conducted in the Pacific since July 1966 when France
moved its nuclear test site from the Reggane Firing Ground in the
Sahara. Since that time the French nuclear tests have been a
perennial sore spot in the diplomatic relations between France and
the nations of the Pacific. The matter has, in fact, been the subject
of notes exchanged between New Zealand and France 2 and between Australia and France3 since 1963 when press reports indicated France's intention to move its test sites to the Pacific.
In the period of twenty-seven years since nuclear tests have
begun, atmospheric testing has been the subject of much diplomatic discussion. 4 Nuclear testing has been the subject of five
multilateral treaties 5 and at least nineteen Resolutions of the
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. B.A., 1961,
Columbia University; J.D., 1964, New York University; LL.M., 1972, King's Col-

lege, London. This article was prepared pursuant to a grant from the Auckland
University Research Committee.
1. The Times, July 23, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
2. See annex HI of the application filed with the Registry of the International
Court of Justice on 9 May 1973 by the Government of New Zealand instituting
proceedings in the case concerning nuclear tests (New Zealand v. France)
[hereinafter cited as New Zealand application].
3. See annexes 2-14 of the application filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice on May 9, 1973 by the Government of Australia instituting
proceedings in the case concerning nuclear tests (Australia v. France)
[hereinafter the Australian application].
4. Id.
5. Multilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water (Moscow Test Ban Treaty) Oct. 10, 1963, [1963]
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United Nations General Assembly.' Atmospheric nuclear tests
have also been condemned in international fokums outside the
United Nations. 7
The French test of July 23rd, however, had a unique legal significance in that it was conducted in apparent defiance of two orders
for interim measures of protection issued by the International
Court of Justice' under article 41 of the Statute of the International
2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; Treaty for Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatleloco) 14 February 1967,
[19711 1 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364 (effective May 12,
1971); Multilateral Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Oct. 10, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 208; Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) March 5, 1970, [1970] 1 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839; Treaty on the Prohibition of the Employment of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed or Ocean Floor
(Seabed Treaty) [1972] 1 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (entered into force May
18, 1972). See also Multilateral Antarctic Treaty June 23, 1961, art. 5, [1961] 1
U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
6. See G.A. Res. 1148, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3729 (1957);
G.A. Res. 1252, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 3, U.N. Doc A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res.
1379, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); G.A. Res. 1402, 14
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc A/4354 (1959); G.A. Res. 1578, 15 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 4, U.N. Doc A/4684 (1960); G.A. Res. 1632, 16 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 17, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); G.A. Res. 1762A, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp.
17, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1910, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at
14, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963); G.A. Res. 2032, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 8-9,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res. 2163, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2324, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2455, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968); G.A. Res. 2604B, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969);
G.A. Res. 2661A, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A.
Res. 2663B, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A.
Rcs. 2828, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res.
2934A-C, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). See New
Zealand application at 14.
7. Conclusion of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee concerning
the Legality of Nuclear Tests, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/172 at 2-4 (1964). 59 AM. J. INT'L
L. 121-22 (1965); Resolution 3 (I) on Nuclear Weapons Tests Adopted by the
Stockholm Conference on the Environment (1972); Resolution W.H.A. 26.57 of
the 26th World Health Assembly, 23 May 1973.
8. New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135. See also Australia v. France,

[19731 I.C.J. 99.
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Court of Justice to the effect that:
The Governments of New Zealand [Australia] and France should
each of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might
aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice
the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court may render in the case; and in particular,
the French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of New Zealand, the
Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands [Australian territory].'
The applications of New Zealand and Australia mark the first
attempt to raise the issue of the legality of nuclear testing before
an international judicial tribunal. The orders of the Court constitute in no sense a final determination of the question of whether
nuclear tests in the atmosphere are legal; they do not even constitute a determination as to whether the Court has jurisdiction in
the case.'"
The question of jurisdiction is very much in issue. Both New
Zealand and Australia claim that there are two alternative bases
for jurisdiction ratione materiae." The first is article 36(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. The provision of the
treaty in force that is claimed as a basis for jurisdiction is article
17 of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (the
General Act) of September 26, 1928,12 which provides:
All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights shall, subject to any reservations which may
be made under Article 39, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the parties agree, in the
manner herinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral tribunal.
It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.
France, New Zealand and Australia all acceded to the General Act
on May 21, 1931.13 Therefore, article 36(1) is coupled with article
9. Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. at 106, 142.
10.
[1973]
11.
12.
13.

Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 105, New Zealand v. France,
I.C.J. 135, 142.
New Zealand application 11, at 8. Australian application 50, at 17.
Sept. 26, 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 2123.
May 21, 1931, 107 L.N.T.S. 2123. The following is the text of the relevant
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37 of the Court's Statute, which provides for continuity of jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice "[w]henever a treaty or
convention in force provides for reference of a matter to . . . the
Permanent Court of International Justice ... "
As an alternative basis for jurisdiction the applicants cited article 36(2), the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.
portions of the French reservation: "Ladite adhesion concernant tous les differends que s'eleveraient apres ladite adhesion au sujet de situations ou de faits
posterioursa elle, autres que ceux que la courpermanent dejustice internationale
reconnaissait comme portant sur un question que le droit internationallaisse a
la competence exclusive de L'Etat; etant entendu que, parapplicationde l'article
39, dudit acte, les differends que les parties ou l'une d'entre elles aurient deferes
au conseil de la Societe des Nations ne seraient soumis aux procedures decrites
par cot acte que si le conseil n'etait parvenue a statuter dans les constitution
prevue a l'article15, alinea 6, du pacte."
("The said accession concerning all disputes that may arise after the said accession with regard to situations or facts subsequent thereto other than those which
the Permanent Court of International Justice may recognize as bearing on a
question left by international law to the exclusive competence of the State, it
being understood that in the application of Article 35 of the said Act the disputes
which the parties or one of them may have referred to the Council of the League
of Nations will not be submitted to the procedures described in this Act unless
the Council has been unable to pronounce a decision under the conditions laid
down in Article 15, paragraph 6 of the Covenant.")
The New Zealand reservations are: "i. Disputes arising prior to the accession
of His Majesty to the said General Act or relating to situations or facts prior to
the said accession; ii. Disputes between His Majesty's Government in New Zealand and the Government of any other member of the League which is a member
of the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in
such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree .... iv. Disputes concerning
questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdictions
of the States; and v. Disputes with any Part to the General Act who is not a
Member of the League of Nations." (The Australian reservations are similar.)
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Even before the case was commenced, France had accepted compulsory jurisdiction in a declaration dated May 16, 1966 filed on
May 26, 1966.14 New Zealand had accepted the compulsory clause
a number of years earlier in a declaration filed April 8, 1940.11
Australia had also previously filed its declaration accepting the
compulsory clause on January 6, 1954.1 Thus, all the parties had
previous declarations on record. France has, however, subsequently renounced the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 7 and
withdrawn from the General Act "without prejudice."
The French Government was not represented at the proceedings
before the Court. However, on May 16, 1972, the Ambassador of
France to the Netherlands handed to the Registrar of the Court a
letter informing the Court that it was "manifestly not competent"
to deal with the dispute and urging the Court to drop the matter
from its docket. In an eighteen-page annex to that letter,"8 the
French Government set forth its position. Its argument was that
the dispute concerned an activity "connected with the national
defense" and thus was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court
by the third French reservation to the compulsory clause. 9 Sec14. [1971-1972] I.C.J.Y.B. 63.
15. Id. at 75.
16. Id. at 55.
17. The Times, Jan. 21, 1974, at 4, col. 6.
18. The text of the Letter is set out in a French Government White Paper on
French Nuclear Tests, Annex BX at 91. The annex to the letter is also in the
White Paper, Annex B XII at 95; both the Australian and New Zealand representatives argued that the fact that eighteen pages were needed to argue the French
Government's position was proof in itself that the Court's lack ofjurisdiction was
not manifest. See also Verbatim Record of Australia's case, Year 1973 Public
Sitting held on Monday 22 May 1973 [hereinafter cited as Public Sitting, 22
May] at 19; Verbatim Record of New Zealand's Case, Year 1973, Public Sitting
of 24 May [hereinafter cited as Public Sitting, 24 May] at 15.
19. As translated by the Secretariat of the United Nations, the French reservation (sent from Paris on May 16, 1966 by Mr. Couve De Murville) reads as
follows: "On behalf of the Government of the French Republic, I declare that I
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
other members of the United Nations which accept the same obligations, that is
to say on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the Court, in conformity with
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, until such time as notice may be given of
the termination of this acceptance, in all disputes which may arise concerning
facts or situations subsequent to this declaration with the exception of: (1) disputes with regard to which the parties may have agreed or may agree to have

44

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 8: 39

ondly, France argued that the "present status of the General Act
and the attitude towards it of the interested parties, and in the first
place of France, rendered it out of the question to consider that
there existed on that basis, on the part of France, that clearly
expressed will to accept the competence of the Court which the
Court itself according to its own constant jurisprudence deems
indispensable for the exercise of its jurisdiction.""0
The Court, in rejecting the French contention that the absence
of jurisdiction is manifest, cited statements in both New Zealand's
and Australia's oral arguments designed to demonstrate that there
was a genuine dispute over jurisdiction. It cited New Zealand representations as saying: "[s]ince 1946 France has more than once
.[A]s
acknowledged that the General Act remains in force ....
far as the General Act is concerned, not only is there no manifest
lack of jurisdiction to deal with this matter, but the Court's jurisdiction on the merits on that basis is reasonably probable, and
there exist weighty arguments in favour of it." 21 In the Australian
case, similar Australian representations were cited to indicate that
a dispute as to the jurisdiction existed.22 The Court concluded on
the basis of these statements "that the provisions invoked by the
applicant appear prima facie to afford a basis on which the jurisrecourse to another mode of pacific settlement; (2) disputes concerning questions
which, according to international law, are exclusively within domestic jurisdiction; (3) disputes arising out of a crisis affecting national security or out of any
measure or action relating thereto, and disputes concerning activities connected
with national defence; (4) disputes with a State which, at the time of occurrence
of the facts or situation giving rise to the dispute, had not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
The Government of the French Republic also reserves the right to supplement,
amend or withdraw at any time the reservations made above, or any other reservation which it may make hereafter, by giving notice to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations; the new reservations, amendments or withdrawals shall take
effect on the date of the said notice."
Apparently the French Government did not press the applicability of the domestic jurisdiction reservation.
20. See Public Sitting, 21 May 1973, at 7; French White Paper, supra note
18, at 92.
21. New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 138, citing Public Sitting, 25
May 1973, at 35.
22. Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 102, citing Public Sitting 22 May
1973, at 37.
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diction of the court might be founded." In other words, the Court
concluded that sufficient jurisdiction existed to ground an Interim
Protection Order under article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice "to preserve the respective rights of either
party." Since the Interim Order of Protection was rendered without prejudice to any final decision on the merits, 24 these questions
remain to be examined in depth in subsequent proceedings.
The Nuclear Tests Cases present some exceedingly interesting
legal questions. The first one is the jurisdictional basis for the
interim order itself. The second question involves the effects of
France's failure to participate and to obey the order. Since France
failed to appear, New Zealand and Australia may call upon the
Court to decide in their favour under article 53(1). Article 53(2),
however, requires the Court to first "satisfy itself, not only that it
has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that
the claim is well founded in fact and law." In other words, the
Court may not enter a default judgment based solely on the fact
of nonappearance of one of the parties. Consequently the Court has
directed that the next written proceedings shall be addressed to
the question of jurisdiction.2
II.

THE JURISDIcTIoNAL BASIS FOR INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION

The jurisdictional basis for interim measures of protection is
contained in article 41(1), which provides: "The Court shall have
power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional [interim] measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party."
The International Court of Justice and its predecessors have
indicated such interim measures on five occasions including the
Nuclear Tests Cases. The Permanent Court of International Justice first granted an interim order in the Sino-Belgian Treaty Case
"pending the final decision of the Court in this case... by which
decision the Court will either declare that it has no jurisdiction or
23.
[1973]
24.
[1973]
25.
[1973]

New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 138; Australia v. France,
I.C.J. 99, 102.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 105; New Zealand v. France,
I.C.J. 135, 142.
New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 142; Australia v. France,
I.C.J. 99, 106.
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give judgment on the merits. 28 The second interim order was
granted in the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and
Bulgaria.2 This Order was granted after the Court had determined
that it had jurisdiction.2 In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case,29 the
International Court of Justice granted an Interim Order of Protection, ordering Iran to avoid taking such steps as would prejudice
Britain's rights by nationalizing the oil industry before the Court
had a chance to decide whether it had jurisdiction. Later, however,
the Court determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the case.39
The FisheriesJurisdictionCases3 1 present a procedural situation
that is almost identical with the Nuclear Tests Cases. In the
FisheriesJurisdiction Cases, Britain and the Federal Republic of
Germany petitioned the Court for an order requiring Iceland to
refrain from enforcing a statute purporting to extend its exclusive
fisheries jurisdiction to a zone of 50 nautical miles around Iceland.
Jurisdiction was presumably based on an exchange of notes between the Foreign Minister of Iceland and the British Ambassador
to Iceland in 1961, which the Government of Iceland claimed to
have terminated on August 31, 1971, in a note transmitted to the
United Kingdom Government and subsequently ratified by the
Icelandic Parliament.
Iceland did not appoint an agent to contest jurisdiction but informed the Court by letter dated May 29, 1972, that "[tihis agreement constituted by the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961 was
not of a permanent nature, that its object and purpose had been
fully achieved, and that it was no longer applicable and had terminated; that there was on 15 April 1972 no basis . . . to exercise
jurisdiction in the case; and that the Government of Iceland...
[was] not willing to confer jurisdiction on the Court. ' 32 The
Court, nevertheless, indicated Interim Measures of Protection saying that the nonappearance of one of the parties cannot by itself
26.
27.
28.
77, at
29.
30.
31.
32.

[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 7.
[1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at 194-200 (Interim Protection).
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No.
65-87 (Preliminary Objections).
[19511 I.C.J. at 89 (Interim Protection).
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952] I.C.J. at 93 (Preliminary Objections).
[1972] I.C.J. at 12, 30.
[19721 I.C.J. at 17.
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constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures. 3
The Court further said that "[o]n a request for provisional measures the Court need not. . . finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case." 34 The Court later by 14 votes to
1 determined that it had jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the
dispute.u
Thus it is well settled in the practice of the Court that it may
grant an interim order before it has fully satisfied itself that it has
jurisdiction and that such an order in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction on the merits of the case. Article 66(1) of
the Rules of the Court provides "[a] request for the indication of
interim measures of protection may be filed at any time during the
proceedings in the case in connection with which it is made."
Under article 41, therefore, a most curious situation arises; the
Court may or may not have jurisdiction to make the order. Yet
requiring the Court first to decide that it has jurisdiction would
seem inconsistent with the provisional nature of article 41 and the
urgency that it anticipates. Furthermore, the basis on which the
Court has consistently grounded these orders has just as surely
dissipated the force of article 41. None of the three interim orders
of the I.C.J. has been complied with. In this writer's opinion the
reasoning of the Court in granting these orders has failed to provide
States with any good reason for obeying them; in fact it has provided them with good reasons for not obeying them.
The doctrine that the Court relied on in the NuclearTests Cases
is the doctrine of prima facie jurisdiction. As discussed above, the
Court was addressing itself to the French contention that lack of
jurisdiction was manifest," a contention derived from the Fisheries
JurisdictionCases decision: "Whereas on a request for provisional
measures the Court need not before indicating them, finally satisfy
itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought
not to act under Article 41 of the Statute if the absence of jurisdiction is manifest."3 The FisheriesJurisdictionCases were the first
33.
34.
35.
36.
[1973]
37.
38.

[1972] I.C.J. at 15.
[1972] I.C.J. at 15.
[1973] I.C.J. at 4.
New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 138; Australia v. France,
I.C.J. 99, 102.
See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
[1972] I.C.J. at 15.
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to mention prima facie jurisdiction, 39 however, in that case, the
Court did not assert that a finding of jurisdiction was probable.
Although the words "prima facie" were not used in the AngloIrarian Oil Case, the doctrine is implicit in the decision. In that
case, Iran objected to the Request for the Indication of Interim
Measures of Protection on the ground that the dispute pertained
to the exercise of sovereign rights of Iran and was exclusively
withifn its national jurisdiction. 0 In answer to the Iranian objection
the Court said:
Whereas it appears from the Application by which the Government of the United Kingdom instituted proceedings, that the Government has adopted the cause of a British company and is proceeding in virtue of the right of diplomatic protection: whereas the complaint made in the Application is one of an alleged violation of
international law by the breach of the agreement for a concession
of April 29th, 1933, and by a denial of justice which according to the
Government of the United Kingdom, would follow from the refusal
of the Iranian Government to accept arbitration in accordance with
that agreement... it cannot be accepted apriorithat a claim based
on such a complaint fall completely outside the scope of international jurisdiction."
The Court was in effect saying that the absence of jurisdiction was
not manifest and that there was a prima facie basis for it.
New Zealand's contention in the Nuclear Tests Cases (New Zealand v. France)that "jurisdiction on the merits is reasonably probable and there exist weighty arguments in favour of it" and no
doubt the Court's citation of this contention 42 constituted an attempt to deal with the criticism expressed by Judges Winiarski
and Badawi Pasha in their dissent to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case.3
These judges felt that "the court has the power to indicate such
measures only if it holds, should it be only provisionally, that it is
39. [1972] I.C.J. at 16.
40. [19511 I.C.J. at 92.
41. [1951] I.C.J. at 92-93.
42. New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 138, citing Public Sitting, May
25, 1973, at 35. The court cannot have placed too great a reliance on the reasonable probability of jurisdiction. There is nothing like the sentence quoted above
[see text accompanying note 21 in Australia's Oral arguments and consequently
it does not appear in the Order in the case of Australia v. France.
43. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, [1952] I.C.J. at 96.
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competent to hear the case on the merits."44
Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha did not go so far as to claim
that the Court should make a final pronouncement on jurisdiction
before indicating interim measures. But they felt that "the court
must consider its competence reasonably probable. 45 After pointing out that in international law it is the consent of the parties that
confers jurisdiction on the Court," they then went on to say:
We find it difficult to accept the view that if prima facie the total
lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not patent, that is, if there is a
feasibility, however remote, that the Court may be competent, then
it may indicate interim measures of protection. This approach...
appears to be based on a presumption in favour of the Court which
is not in consonance with the principles of international law. In
order to accord with these principles the principle should be reversed: if there exist weighty arguments in favour of the challenged
jurisdiction, the Court may indicate interim measures of protection;
if there exists doubt or weighty arguments against this jurisdiction
such measures cannot be indicated."
This reasoning was adopted by Judge Padilla Nervo, the lone dissent in the FisheriesJurisdiction Cases who felt that such doubts
48
existed in that case.
The Court's acceptance of the New Zealand argument constituted an attempt to answer these past dissents. Nevertheless it
failed to quiet uneasiness about the doctrine of prima facie jurisdiction particularly when it involved a highly sensitive political
issue like nuclear testing. The Court divided by a vote of 8 to 6 in
both Nuclear Test Cases-amuch narrower vote than the 14 to 1
decision in the Fisheries JurisdictionCases.
Judge Forster, even though he had voted with the majority in the
FisheriesJurisdictionCases, urged the abandonment of the prima
facie doctrine, in the light of the "exceptional" nature of the
Nuclear Tests Cases:
The Court should above all have satisfied itself that it really had
jurisdiction and not contented itself with a mere probability.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
[1972] I.C.J. at 22.

Case,
Case,
Case,
Case,

[1952]
[1952]
[1952]
[1952]

I.C.J.
I.C.J.
I.C.J.
I.C.J.

at
at
at
at

96.
96.
96.
97.
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It is not a question of approving or condemning the French nuclear tests in the Pacific; the real problem is to find out whether we
have jurisdiction to say or do anything whatever in this case.
It was that problem of jurisdiction which it was necessary for us
to solve as a matter of absolute priority, before pronouncing upon
the interim measures.49 (Emphasis added.)
In this extract, taken from the New Zealand Case, Judge Forster
was referring to his dissenting opinion in the Australia Case", in
which he examined the jurisdictional issues and found first that
the General Act was "moribund if not well and truly dead,"5 1 and
secondly that the third French reservation "in terms that are crystal clear categorically excludes our jurisdiction when the dispute
is concerned with national defence" 2 and that "French nuclear
tests in the Pacific do concern French national defence."-3 Accordingly he concluded: "The Order made this day is an incursion into
a French sector of activity placed strictly out of bounds by the
third reservation of 16 May 1966. To cross the line into that sector,
the Court required no mere probability but the absolute certainty
of possessing jurisdiction. As I personally have been unable to
attain that degree of certainty, I have declined to accompany the
majority."5
One can only conclude, if this argument is not to be seen as
completely circular, that Judge Forster viewed the applicability of
the defense reservation as given and that the only possible jurisdictional basis for the Nuclear Tests Cases is the General Act-and
he felt that it was not a very good basis. The opinion is perhaps
just short of being a definitive finding that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case.
None of the other judges went quite so far in examining the
actual issue of jurisdiction to hear the merits. Judge Gros felt that
article 53(2), which requires the Court to satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction in accordance with articles 36 and 37 in the event that
a party fails to appear, is applicable to interim orders under article
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 148.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 111.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 112.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 112.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 112.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 113.

Fall 1974]

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING

41.51 He, too, urged abandonment of the prima facie jurisdiction
doctrine but on the ground that it was inconsistent with article
53(2). Judge Gros' reasoning involves a rather curious inconsistency: article 53(2) applies only when a party fails to appear. Thus,
if the Court followed Judge Gros' reasoning to its logical conclusion, it would end up penalizing the party that did appear by
applying the prima facie doctrine; whereas the party that failed to
appearwould thereby force the Court to apply a much stronger test
in determining whether there was jurisdiction to ground an interim
order.
Judge Petren 56 felt that the Court "would not have needed any
further explanations from the New Zealand [Australian] government in order to resolve the question of jurisdiction. ' '57 He declined
to indicate his assessment of the various factors entering into consideration of the jurisdiction question, but he did not find it probable that any of the propositions upon which New Zealand and
Australia based their claim of jurisdiction would afford a basis in
which to found the jurisdiction of the Court."
Judge Ignacio-Pinto also dissented and devoted his opinion primarily to the task of distinguishing the Nuclear Tests Cases from
the FisheriesJurisdictionCases." From his reasoning, however, it
seems that he too believed that the Court did not possess jurisdiction.' He also found it difficult to ascertain from the Australian
and the New Zealand submissions the precise rules of international
law that France is said to violate.6
The real problem with the prima facie jurisdiction doctrine is
that most of the judges who have resorted to it have been extremely
uneasy about the idea that the Court has the power to indicate
measures of protection without first rendering a final decision to
hear the merits of the case. Four of the judges who voted with the
55.

Australia v. France, [19731 I.C.J. 99, 115; New Zealand v. France,

[1973] I.C.J. 135, 149 (Gros).
56.
[1973]
57.
[1973]
58.

New Zealand v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 135, 159; Australia v. France,
I.C.J. 99, 124 (Petren).
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 125; New Zealand v. France,
I.C.J. 135, 160 (Petren).
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 126; New Zealand v. France,

[1973] I.C.J. 135, 161 (Petren).
59.
60.
61.

Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 130 (Pinto).
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 130 (Pinto).
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 130 (Pinto).
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majority appended Declarations12 and the Declarations of Judges
de Arechaga and Singh both expressed caveats as to the importance of jurisdiction.
The reasons for the judges' uneasiness is best illustrated by reference to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case in which, after first indicating
interim measures, the Court ultimately determined that it was
without jurisdiction.63 If the Court had viewed article 36 as the sole
basis of jurisdiction to grant an interim order, then it would have
had to admit that it had been wrong ab initio in issuing the order.
It would then have followed that Iran had a strong case for disregarding the order. It is perhaps for this reason, among others, that
Iceland and France, convinced as they still are that the absence of
jurisdiction is "manifest," felt that they were within their legal
rights in flouting the order of the Court. Yet article 41 is in the
Statute, it subsists, and states resort to it.
It is a fallacy to assert that articles 36 and 37 of the Statute
provide the sole juridical basis upon which orders under article 41
must be grounded. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently striven
to find some nexus with either article 36 or 37, whether it was Iran's
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, an agreement between Britain and Iceland
under article 36(1) in the FisheriesJurisdictionCases, or alternatively a "convention in force" or acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in the Nuclear Tests Cases. In short, the Court has consistently ignored the possibility that other grounds exist. Only in the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (Preliminary Objections) did the Court
find that the jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of protection was grounded in something other than articles 36 and 37 of
the I.C.J. Statute:
While the Court derived its power to indicate these provisional
measures from the special provisions. .. in Article 41 of the Statute,
it must now derive its jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case
from the general rules laid down in Article 36 of the Statute. These
general rules, which are entirely different from the special provisions
of Article 41, are based on the principle that the jurisdiction of the
62. Judges Jiminez de Arechaga, Naghendra Singh, Sir Garfield Barwick and
Sir Humphrey Waldock.
63. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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Court to deal with and decide a case on the merits depends on the
64
will of the Parties.
Thus the Court avoided the contention that its interim protection
order was wrong ab initio. Although article 41 is not a jurisdiction
provision, the Court did not state from what source jurisdictional
authority for article 41 is derived.
If the Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (Preliminary Objections) departed from the fallacy that articles 36 and 37 were the
sole grounds for jurisdiction to indicate interim orders, other
judges were quick to return to it in subsequent cases. Judge Forster, for example, said in the Nuclear Test Cases: "In my view the
Court does not have two distinct kinds of jurisdiction; one to be
exercised in respect of provisional measures and another to deal
with the merits of the case."6 5
It is indeed a generally acknowledged principle that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is based on consent. 6
However, the idea that articles 36 and 37 provide the only grounds
for manifesting consent is a misconception. The Court has jurisdiction to order interim measures of protection in the Nuclear Test
Cases. This jurisdiction is based on consent, and it is submitted
that this consent is not expressed through articles 36 and 37. It is
a fundamental axiom in all legal systems6 7 that a court may not
hear and determine a dispute unless it has jurisdiction. To assume
that jurisdiction is a simple matter that can be settled on an either/or basis is a semantic error as well as a legal error. This was
the error that Judge Gros made when he said:
A State either is or [... ] is not subject to a tribunal. If it is not,
it cannot be treated as a "party" to a dispute, which would be nonjusticiable. The position which the Court has taken is that a State
which regards itself as not concerned in a case, which fails to appear,
and affirms its refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, cannot
obtain from the Court anything more than a postponement of the
consideration of its rights. 6
64. United Kingdom v. Iran, [1952] I.C.J. 102-03.
65. Australia v. France [1973] I.C.J. 99, 111 (Forster).
66. Supra note 46. See also quotation of French note, note 20 and accompanying text supra.
67. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS

(1953). Citing Mayromatis Palestine Concession Case

(Jurisdiction), [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 6-93.

68. Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 118 (Gros).
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CATEGORIES OF JuRISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS

Questions of jurisdiction may be separated into four categories:
Ratione Personae, Ratione Materiae, Ratione Temporis, and
Ratione Loci. Three of these categories are applicable to the International Court of Justice; the fourth, ratione loci, is vital to municipal tribunals and some international tribunals, 9 but is not really
relevant to the International Court of Justice. Problems of jurisdiction ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae before the
International Court of Justice are vital issues. Perhaps the controversy surrounding article 41 of the I.C.J. Statute might be resolved
first by examining the distinction between these jurisdictional
bases and then by examining the power that each type of jurisdiction confers upon the International Court of Justice.
When a court or tribunal has jurisdiction rationepersonae, the
court usually has jurisdiction over the person or over the parties
to the dispute. There are two basic aspects of jurisdiction ratione
personae: the first involves the access of the plaintiff or the applicant to the court; the second involves the authority of the court
over the defendant or respondent. In municipal law, the access of
the plaintiff to the court is generally treated as a question of standing to sue and involves the interest of the plaintiff in the subject
matter of the dispute. 0 Authority over the defendant is usually
linked with the jurisdiction ratione loci, which in France is called
competence ratione personae vel loci 1 and is principally deter-

mined par le domicile du defendeur 2 Under certain circumstances, however, jurisdiction may hinge solely on the presence of le
defendeur in France. Article 14 of the Code Civile provides:
"L'tranger,m~me non resident en France... pourra 6tre traduit
devant les Tribuneaux de Francepour les obligationspar lui contract~e en pays 6tranges envers des Franqais.,73 In the AngloAmerican system jurisdiction may be had-in civil cases over a
defendant who is caught even fleetingly in the territorial jurisdic69. Such international tribunals include the European Court of Human
Rights and the Courts of Justice of the European Communities.
70. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Independent Broadcasting Authority,
[19731 2 W.L.R. 344 (C.A.).
71. 1 CARBONNIER, Dnorr CIVILE 63 (5th ed. 1964).
72. Id. art. 59.
73. C.Civ. art. 14 (71e ed. Dalloz 1971-72).

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING

Fall 19741

tion of the court.74 Chapter 19, section 1 of the Swedish Code of
Judicial Procedure (Rittegangbalk)5 provides: "The competent
court in civil cases is the court for the place in which the defendant
resides

. ..
"

and the same holds true in German law.76 In all these

legal systems persons over whom the court does not otherwise have
jurisdiction may voluntarily consent to the jurisdiction of a court.7
In criminal law, jurisdiction over the defendant may attach if
the defendant is apprehended in the territory of the prosecuting
state. In the Lotus case,78 the Permanent Court of International
Justice had before it a case in which a French citizen was tried
under a provision of the Turkish Criminal Code which provided
that "[a]ny foreigner who ...

commits an offence abroad to the

prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject, for which offence
Turkish law prescribes a penalty involving a loss of freedom for a
minimum period of not less than one year, shall be punished in
accordance with the Turkish Penal Code provided he is arrested
in Turkey."79 The Court held that no principle of international law
existed that could prevent Turkey from exercising jurisdiction over
persons found within its territory for crimes committed outside its
territory."0
Regarding the International Court of Justice, problems of jurisdiction ratione personae must be treated in a somewhat different
manner. Problems that involve standing to sue are common and
are expressed in such rules as the rule requiring the exhaustion of
local remedies81 and the rule of nationality of claims," which have
a bearing upon the access of the plaintiff to the Court. Since
74. See, e.g., Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein, [1972] 2 Q.B. 283. The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 28 (1971) states that "(Presence) A
State has power to exercise juridical jurisdiction over an individual who is present
within its territory, whether permanently or temporarily."
75. (A. Bruzelius, R. B. Ginzburg transl. 1968).
76. See ZPO §§ 12-37 (Wieczorek 1966).
77. For France see C. Cirv. art. 111; C. PRo. Civ. art. 59 (11) (Dalloz 1971-72).
For Germany see ZPO § 39. For Sweden see RAr'EGMASBALK Ch. 19, § 16 (A.
Bruzelius, R. B. Ginzburg Transl. 1968). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, supra note 74, 32.
78. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 4-108.
79. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 15.
80. [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 19.
81. Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 21.
82. Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), [1958] I.C.J. 5.
83. Another rule relating to standing is expressed in article 34(1) of the Stat-
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jurisdiction is always based on consent, the focal question is not
about the Court's power over the parties but rather whether the
party's consent to the jurisdiction of the Court is adequately expressed. The key provisions in this respect are article 93 of the
United Nations Charter and article 35 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 93 of the United Nations Charter
provides: "(1) All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. (2) A
state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice ... "
Thus consent to the jurisdiction of the Court rationepersonae is
expressed either through adherence to the United Nations Charter
or to the Statute of the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of article 93(2). Article 94(1) then speaks
of the obligations of members of the United Nations: "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision
of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party." Consequently the duty of compliance with the Court's decisions is imposed by virtue of the Court's competence ratione
personae. Article 35(1) of the Statute provides that the Court shall
be open to the parties to the Statute, and article 35(2) provides for
nonparties to accept the jurisdiction of the Court voluntarily.
Jurisdiction ratione materiae refers to the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of a dispute. In France it is called
competence d'attribution.In other words, it refers to the types of
cases the Court is authorized to decide. For instance, in France the
Tribuneaux Commercials and in Austria the Handelsgerichteare
authorized to apply only Commercial Law. The International
Court of Justice is under similar limitations ratione materiae.
Article 38 sets out the law that the Court is authorized to apply:
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
internationallaw such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
ute of the I.C.J., which provides that "only States may be parties in cases before
the Court."
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(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(2) This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. (Emphasis added.)
Thus the law that the International Court of Justice must apply
is international law; to decide a case on any other basis requires
the consent of the parties. There are, however, other types of limitations on jurisdiction ratione materiae. For example, in Germany
the jurisdiction of the Amtgericht in civil litigation comprises:
(a) all cases where the amounts involved are not more than DM
1500:
(b) most disputes between landlord and tenant:
(c) all disputes between travellers and innkeepers, coachmen and
shippers, relating to charges arising out of the journey:
(d) all disputes regarding defects of cattle and damages done by
animals ferae naturae:
(e) all disputes regarding statutory claims for maintenance:
(f) illegitimacy questions:
(g) all applications for the issue of orders of arrest and einstweilige
Verfungunt 4 if the property to be arrested or in respect of which the
einstweilige Verfugung is applied for, or if the person who is to be
arrested is within the district of the Amtgericht, and provided the
matter is of great urgency. 5
In France Juges de paix handle all civil actions that are purely
personal in their nature and relate to movables when the amount
in controversy does not exceed fr. 150,000. In the United States the
United States District Court has original jurisdiction of "all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs and arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.""6 In essence,
rules ratione materiae relate generally to the types of matters the
court is authorized to adjudicate.
IV.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COURT'S JURISDICION

The Travaux Pr~paratoiresof the Statute of the Permanent
84. See text Part VI infra.
85. 2 COHN, MANuAL OF GERimN LAw, 970 (1971), citing GVG § 23, 23a.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
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Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.), which is almost identical
in substance to the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
reveal that the distinction between provisions relating to jurisdiction ratione personae and those relating to jurisdiction8 ratione
materiae came to be well understood among the drafters. 1
Unlike the International Court of Justice, which is a principal
organ of the United Nations under article 7 of the United Nations
Charter, the Permanent Court of International Justice was not an
organ of the League of Nations. Since the P.C.I.J. did not exist
when the League Covenant was drawn up, the Covenant imposed
upon the League Council the duty to establish the Court. Article
14 of the Covenant provided: "The Council shall formulate and
submit to members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court
shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The
Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or the Assembly."
The Court, once established, was to play an important part in
the League of Nations peace-keeping machinery enunciated in articles 12-14. Pursuant to article 12(1) members of the League
agreed to submit any dispute that was likely to lead to a rupture
either to arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council.
Article 12, paragraphs 2 and 3 provided:
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question
of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or
as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such
breach are declared to be among those which are generally suitable
for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement.
3. For consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the
87. In fact in the first case to grant an interim order, the Denunciationof the
Treaty of November 2, 1865 Between China and Belgium, the Court adhered to
the distinction between the basis for jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione
materiae, citing them separately. "Whereas... Belgium and China have signed
and ratified the Protocol of signature of December 16, 1920, relating to the adoption of the Statute of the Court;
... as these two Powers have recognized as compulsory the Court's jurisdiction
in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's statute ....

P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 7.

."

[1972]
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case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal
agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
Article 13(4) may be regarded as the forerunner of article 94 of the
United Nations Charter. It provided that: "The Members of the
League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award
or decision that may be rendered and that they will not resort to
war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In
the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the
Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect
thereto."
Pursuant to article 14 of the Covenant, the Council of the
League, at its second public meeting passed a resolutionm establishing a Committee of distinguished jurists, representatives of the
different civilizations and legal systems of the world, who would
be responsible to the Council and would prepare plans for the
Permanent Court. Discussion of the Court's jurisdiction began at
the 9th Meeting of the Jurists' Committee" at which time they
discussed whether individuals would have standing before the
Court. The Committee" concluded that only states could be parties to the Court, thus establishing the first rule relating to jurisdiction ratione personae.
At the 10th Meeting9 ' the Committee first discussed whether
access to the Court should be limited to members of the League of
Nations or whether other states should be given access. It was
initially assumed on the basis of articles 12 to 14 of the Covenant
that Members of the League would have access to the Court. The
Committee agreed provisionally that the Statute of the Court
ought to contain rules governing voluntary use of the Court by
nonmembers subject to certain conditions that would impose upon
the nonmember users financial obligations and a duty to accept
the judgment of the Court.2
Dr. B.C.J. Loder, member of the Cour de Cassationof the Neth88.

1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 36-37 (1920).

89.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, PROCES VERBAUX OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CoMirr-

TEE [hereinafter PROCES VERBAUX]

90.
91.
92.

Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 219-32.
Id. at 223.

203-17 (1920).
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erlands, then proposed that the jurisdiction of the Court be made
compulsory, independent of any conventions. 3 Mr. Francis Hagerup, Norwegian Minister at Stockholm, former Premier of Norway,
asked Dr. Loder if he held to this view even when plaintiff was not
a member of the League of Nations. Dr. Loder replied "No." 5 Mr.
Elihu Root, former Secretary of State of the United States, supported Dr. Loder's proposal, pointing out that the principle of
compulsory arbitration had been accepted in 1907 and had appeared in numerous treaties ratified between states since that
time. " The only member of the Committee to dissent to the proposal for compulsory jurisdiction was Mr. Mineichiro Adatci, the
Japanese Minister at Brussels, who objected that compulsory jurisdiction was contrary to the second sentence of article 14 of the
Covenant, which he felt limited the competence of the Court to
"disputes which the parties submitted to it.""
The members who supported compulsory jurisdiction were reluctant to retreat from the principle, which they felt was an idea
whose time had come because of the unanimous support it had
received at the Hague Convention of 1907. In a memorandum to
the Committee Dr. Loder explained his position:
[W]hy create this Court? In order to duplicate the Court of Arbitration? To continue a deplorable state of affairs and administer
justice between two contending parties only after having obtained
their mutual consent, and their agreement on the wording of the
complaint, and on the choice of judges? That is not worth the trouble.
The Covenant did not intend to abolish arbitration, but it wished
to place beside it a Court of Justice. The latter must be permanent,
it must be open to all who present themselves before it for a decision
in all cases which come within the bounds of its competence.
93. Id. at 229.
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 229-30. At the second Hague Conference in 1907, an attempt was

made to establish a "Court of Arbitral Justice." The project was enthusiastically
supported by both the great and the small powers and the principle of compulsory
arbitration was unanimously accepted. But the attempt failed because of disagreement over the appointment of judges. The great powers insisted on perma-

nent representation. The small powers demanded equality. FAc~mi, PERmAN
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
97. PRocES VERBAUX, at 231.

3 (2d ed. 1932).

T

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING

Fall 1974]

In 1907 a vain attempt was made to create a Court of Justice. It
was still a Court of Arbitral Justice. How could it have been otherwise? The bond between the States was lacking.
It was only the institution of the League of Nations that made
possible a Court of Justice, a court where the plaintiff would no
longer have to wait upon the good will of his opponent. It is such a
court that is intended in the Covenant and not a useless duplication.18 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, early discussion tended to be vague about the distinction
between jurisdiction ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione
materiae, but the distinction became clearer once draft articles
were tabled for discussion. The first draft of an article dealing with
jurisdiction ratione materiae was presented to the Committee by
Baron Descamp, the Belgian Minister of State and the President
of the Committee. Following the language of article 13(2) of the
League Covenant quoted above, it provided:
The Permanent Court of International Justice is competent to
decide disputes concerning cases of a legal nature, that is to say
those dealing with:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of any international obligation;
d. the extent and nature of any reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation;
e. the interpretation of a sentence rendered by the Court. 9
Lord Phillimore, member of the Privy Council of Great Britain,
has been quoted on this article as follows:
He [Lord Phillimore] recalled that the Committee had already
come to an agreement on the subject of the personal competence of
the Court; all States, and not only a few should have the right to
take action before the Court. The project submitted by the President [Baron Descamps] was intended to establish also an agreement concerning the material competence. The agreement concerning the personal competence had not yet been drafted; in order to
make the text complete, Lord Phillimore said that he was prepared
to draw up a formula on this subject also. '

98. PRocFs VERBAUX, 12th mtg., Annex No. 1, at 250-51.
99.

PRocEs VERBAUX, 13th mtg., Annex No. 1, art. 1, at 272; subpara. (e) was

later dropped.
100.

PRocEs VERBAUX, 13th mtg., at 290.
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Accordingly Lord Phillimore submitted the following proposed article: "Any State subscribing to the present Act is considered as
having agreed to submit to the Permanent Court any dispute between itself and another signatory as described in Article 1."' 1
Thus the distinction between jurisdiction ratione personae and
jurisdiction ratione materiae clearly emerged. The former was expressed, through consent by adherence to the Act. The latter dealt
with the types of cases that the Court was authorized to decide.
At the same time this provision involved acceptance of Dr. Loder's
plan for compulsory jurisdiction.
The primary modification that the Jurists' Committee made
occurred in response to an objection to allowing states that were
not members of the League the benefit of compulsory jurisdiction.
The outcome of the discussion was that the Statute of the Court,
which was subject to the approval of the Council and the Assembly
of the League of Nations, could confer rights and privileges upon
states that were not members of the League, but under article
13(4) of the Covenant could impose obligations only upon states
that were members.
Therefore, the two primary jurisdiction provisions that emerged
from the Committee were articles 32 and 34 of the Committee's
draft. Article 32, relating to jurisdiction ratione personae, provided:
The Court shall be open of right to the States mentioned in the
annex to the Covenant, and to such others as shall subsequently
enter the League of Nations.
Other States may have access to it.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open as of right or
accessible to States which are not members of the League of Nations
shall be determined by the Council, in accordance with Article 17
of the Covenant.
Article 32 was adopted by the League Council with paragraph 1
simplified to provide that the "Court shall be open to the members
of the League and also to States mentioned in the Annex to the
Covenant." Article 32 is not too different from article 35 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Article 34 of the Committee's draft received much rougher treatment from the League Council. It read: "Between States which are
101.

PRocEs VERBAUX, 13th mtg., Annex No. 4, at 276.
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members of the League of Nations the Court shall have jurisdiction
[and this without any special convention giving it jurisdiction] to
hear and determine cases of a legal nature .
".1..02(Emphasis
added.) Lord Balfour, the representative of Great Britain, took the
lead in urging the rejection of the obligatory jurisdiction provision.
He felt, as did some members of the Committee, that the draft
10 3
went beyond the authority granted by Article 14 of the Covenant.
Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court, as finally
adopted by the League, is quite similar to article 36 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. Article 36 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court provided:
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in Treaties and
Conventions in force.
The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned
in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying
the protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined, or at a later
moment, declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or
any of the classes of legal disputes .... 04I (Emphasis added.)
The annex referred to in article 35 contained a list of signatures
and ratifications of the Protocol of Signature of December 16,
1920.15 The acceptances of the compulsory clause were listed separately from the protocol of signature in an annex to it."06 Thus
whereas under the jurists' scheme consent of states was needed
only to obtain jurisdiction rationepersonae, the Council's change
had the effect of imposing upon jurisdiction ratione materiae an
element of consent, which did not exist under the jurists' compulsory scheme.
It may be argued that "compulsory jurisdiction" is illusory when
102.

ScoTT, THE PROJECT OF APERMANENT

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS (1920).
103. DocuEN'rs CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE COVENANT AND THE ADOPTION BY THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT

38 (1921) [hereinafter cited

DOCUMENTS].

104. 1 M. HUDSON,
105. Id.
106. Id. at 29-48.

WORLD COURT REPORTS

23 (1934).

as
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applied to international courts and tribunals. A sovereign state can
never, as a matter of practice, be arraigned before any tribunal by
another state unless it has specifically agreed to accept the tribunal's jurisdiction. This axiom follows from the nature of sovereignty and the reality of practice. This observation may appear to
render the whole of the above discussion futile; indeed, it appears
to render articles 35 and 36(2) of the Court's Statute and articles
93 and 94 of the United Nations Charter meaningless. Meaningless, that is, unless one views these articles as establishing legal
norms-norms which states may adhere to or violate-and accepts
that legal consequences flow from adherence to or violation of these
norms.
References in article 36 of the Court Statute to "cases which the
parties refer to it" in paragraph 1 and "legal disputes" in paragraph 2 clearly indicate that jurisdiction ratione materiae is the
type of jurisdiction contemplated by this provision. These references to jurisdiction ratione materiae may be distinguished from
article 93 of the United Nations Charter and article 35 of the Court
Statute, which provide a basis for acceptance of jurisdiction
ratione personae by the Court.
Even after the Statute was changed, Dr. Loder, who became
President of the Permanent Court of International Justice from
1922-24 had the following to say about the jurisdiction of the
P.C.I.J.:
It is evident that a Court which will have to adjudicate between
sovereign, and, therefore independent, States, needs a title upon
which its judicature is based, and that this title will be no other than
agreement. This agreement is the League of Nations itself. It is the
League that has proposed calling the Court into being, that has
stipulated its threefold activity, and has commissioned its own organs to work out and adopt the necessary plans. To join the League
is, therefore, at the same time to recognise the competency of the
Court.... States not belonging to the League would be excluded
from admittance to the Court, as the Court itself, for lack of jurisdiction over them, would not be able to give them hearing.',
107. Loder, The Permanent Court of InternationalJustice and Compulsory
INT'L L. 6, 13 (1921-1922).

Jurisdiction,2 BRrr. Y.B.
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V.

THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF ARTICLE 41

There are varying interpretations of the meaning of the interim
order itself. One point of view" 8 is that the authority of international tribunals to indicate interim measures of protection, when
its jurisdiction as to the merits remains uncertain, is a "general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations" and, therefore,
comes within article 38(1)(c) of the Court's Statute. Professor
Cheng in examining this provision said:
[I]n adopting this provision, the members of the Advisory Committee did not intend to add to the armoury of the international
judge a whole new adjunct to existing international law actuated by
the belief that existing international law consisted in more than the
sum total of positive rules, in adopting the formula "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations", they were only
giving a name to that part of existing international law which is not
covered by conventions and customs, sensu stricto. It was said that
the application of these principles had hitherto been a constant
practice of international tribunals and although it might be said
that the latter in applying them, brought latent rules of law to light,
they did not create new rules ...."I (Emphasis added.)
Professor Cheng's treatment of interim protection as a principle
shared by a large number of international tribunals past and present 1 is an attempt to demonstrate its inclusion in the category of
general principles. Professor Cheng explained that the principle of
interim protection was inherent in the basic characteristics of international law: "This part of international law does not consist,
therefore, in specific rules formulated for practical purposes, but
in general propositions underlying the various rules of law which
express the essential qualities of juridical truth itself, in short,
Law.""' The authority of international tribunals to indicate in108. Supra note 67 at 267-74.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 267-68.
111. Id. at 24. Also on page 25 he states that the word 'civilized' must be
considered as merely redundant, "since any state which is a member of international society must be considered as civilized." But see North Sea Continental
Shelf Case, [1969] I.C.J. 134 (Ammoun). Judge Ammoun at page 132 objected
to the term "civilized nations" as a legacy of colonialism. Professor Cheng would
no doubt question the statement at page 136: "the general principles of law are
indisputably factors which bring morality into the law of nations inasmuch as
they borrow from the law of the nations' principles of moral order."
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terim orders of protection partakes of that characteristic, according to Professor Cheng, because of the "duty of the parties to the
dispute to maintain the status quo,"1 '2 which, he claims, exists
independently of any judicial intervention.
Professor Guggenheim, however, points out that if interim protection were a general principle of law, then it might follow that
international tribunals will have the power to order interim protection even without specific rules. Article 41 would be superfluous. 13'
The drafters felt that it was necessary to introduce article 41 as a
treaty provision capable of direct application. Although Professor
Guggenheim does not deny that interim protection is a general
principle of law, he cites authority to the effect that despite interim protection being a general principle of law, specific rules are
required before a tribunal can exercise the authority to order interim protection.'
One of the authorities cited, Professor Dumbauld, treats interim protection specifically as a general principle
of law recognized by civilized nations.11 5 While he considers that
protection of rights endangered pendente lite is a logical consequence of modern civil procedure,' 6 he does not rest there, but
devotes an entire chapter to a comparative analysis of provisional
remedies at Roman Law, German Law, Austrian Law, French Law
and Hungarian Law" 7 to demonstrate that provisional remedies
exist or existed in all these legal systems. With regard to the International Court of Justice, Professor Dumbauld feels that jurisdiction to grant interim protection is separate and independent from
jurisdiction over the action in chief in view of the need for rapidity
and the provisional nature of that order."'
The member of the Jurists' Committee most concerned with
interim orders of protection was Mr. Raoul Fernandes, Brazilian
member of the Reparations Commission established under the
Treaty of Versailles. His learned memorandum to the Committee
112. Id. at 273.
113. Guggenheim, Les Mesures Conservatoiresdans la ProcedureArbitrale et
Judicaire40 REcUEIL DES CoURS 649,651n.1 (1932).
114. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 181 (1932); NIEMEYER, EINSTWEILIGE VERGUNGEN DES WELTGERICHTSHOFES, IHR WESON AND IHRE GRENZE 27 (1932).

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 177-78.
at 2, 20.
at ch. II.
at 161-65.
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outlined the nature of the interim order of protection and its relation to municipal law:
In their relation with things, States, whether as subjects of private
or public property, or in the sphere of territorial sovereignty, exercise dejure or de facto possession, sometimes over things, sometimes
over servitudes and often-outside any conception of propertywith regard to the complex of political powers which constitute
sovereignty.
In international law, these legal relations are based on principles
borrowed from Roman Law.
In Roman Law, possessory protection including the possession of
things and the quasi-possession of servitudes was assured by interdicts and the interdict procedure was adopted by the laws of modern
nations as a sine qua non of an economic system based on property,
such as we have inherited from the Romans."'
Accordingly Mr. Fernandes proposed the following draft article:
"In case the cause of the dispute should consist of certain acts
already committed, or about to be committed, the Court may,
provisionally and with the least possible delay, order [Ordonne
adequate protective measures to be taken, pending the final judgment of the Court."120 He also proposed that the Court attach
certain penalties for noncompliance with the order.
The Jurists' Committee rejected the proposal for penalties1 2' but
retained the interim order in the following form:
If the dispute arises out of an act which has already taken place
or which is imminent, the Court shall have the power to suggest, if
it considers that circumstances so require, the provisional measures
that shouldbe taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall
forthwith be given to the parties and the Council.'2 (Emphasis
added.)
One additional change occurred in the drafting of article 41 that
should have a bearing on this discussion. The Jurists' Committee
referred its draft report to the First Assembly of the League of
119.
120.
121.
122.

PRoCFs VERBAUX, 29th mtg., Annex No. 3, at 608.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id.
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Nations, ' which established a Committee consisting of representatives of 36 states to review the draft. To consider various problems
in detail, that Committee appointed a subcommittee which consisted of ten members-five former members of the Jurists' Committee and five other legal experts. 24 At the fifth meeting of that
subcommittee, a discussion arose concerning the binding effect of
the interim
order that had been accepted by the Jurists' Commit,
tee. i

Mr. Huber of Switzerland felt that the word "suggest" in the
English text of article 41 was less strong than the word "indique"
in the French text. He insisted that the stronger term should be
considered authentic. Mr. Fernandes recalled that at The Hague
he had proposed the word "ordonne," and he felt that the question
was not merely one of drafting but one of principle. The Chairman
of the Subcommittee pointed out that Mr. Fernandes' proposal
had been rejected by the Jurists' Committee because the Court
lacked the means of execution. Yet after a short discussion it was
agreed to take the French text as authentic. The English word
"suggest" was replaced by "indicate" and the word "should" by
"ought to." Thus the drafters opted for the strongest language that
would realistically reflect the Court's powers.
VI.

INTERDICT AND ITS SUCCESSORS

Perhaps Mr. Fernandes' analysis of interim orders of protection
may be criticized for overemphasizing the relationship between
interdict and property. Interdicts are widely believed to have origi-2
nated as a remedy for injuries to something of a public character'
such as the prevention of a possible interference with a public
roadway; nonpossessory interdicts, for instance, one requiring a
defendant to produce a freeman2 who had allegedly been wrongfully
detained, were also available.'

1

Nonetheless, Mr. Fernandes' memorandum to the Jurists' Com123.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS ASSEMBLY, RECORDS OF FIRST ASSEMBLY, PLENARY

MEETINGS, TEXT OF DEBATES 48, 52 (1920).

124.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS ASSEMBLY, RECORDS OF FIRST ASSEMBLY, MEETINGS OF

COMMITTEES, MINUTES 282-84 (1920).
125. DOCUMENTS, PROCES VERBAUX OF THE MEETINGS OF THE SuB-CoMMITTEE OF
THE THIRD COMMITTEE, 5th mtg., 29 November 1920, at 134.
126. SANDARS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN lxiii (1910).

127.

See Buckland, supra note 119, at 731.
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mittee provides an insight into the nature of interim protection
which might be quite useful in examining its jurisdictional basis.
Interim protection, like the Roman Law possessory interdict, may
be viewed as a provisional possessory remedy designed to protect
the rights of the subjects of the legal system with respect to its
objects. In municipal law, the subjects are natural and juristic
persons while the objects fall into one of the numerous classes of
property. In international law, the subjects are generally states and
the objects are generally people, territory, servitudes and the incidents of sovereignty.ln In this respect the institution of sovereignty
may be viewed as similar to the institution of property.
There are, however, "civilized" societies that do not have economic systems based on property. Thus it cannot be asserted that
principles of law involving possessory remedies designed to protect
property rights are generally valid for all legal systems. Nevertheless, when the legal system regulates the rights and duties of subjects with respect to objects of law, the provisional possessory remedy may be viewed as an essential element of "judicial truth" in
that system. The power of a court to adjudicate these rights and
the duty of a court and the parties to protect the status quo
pending adjudication follow as a corollary of that principle.' 9 In
other words, the power of a court to indicate interim orders of
protection is a general principle of law, recognized in many legal
systems, which is valid in international law. A general principle
need not be shared by all legal systems to be acceptable under the
heading of article 38(1)(c).' 30
If, on the other hand, it is undesirable to designate the power to
indicate interim orders as a "general principle" of law, the power
is nonetheless justified as a matter of treaty interpretation when
the remedy is analyzed both as it operates in the legal system from
which the drafters purported to derive it and as it operates in other
legal systems derived from that system and sharing the same characteristics on which it is based.
At Roman law, actions were distinguished according to their
judicial origin. Those actions that were established by enactment
or founded on the civil law were called civil actions. Praetorian
128. See generally Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, [1923]

P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at 7-32.
.129. See supra note 112.
130. See supra note 67, at 1-26.
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actions, on the other hand, were granted by the Praetorin virtue
- ' The remedy of interdict was
of his jurisdiction over the person.13
a praetorian remedy. Interdicts were decrees or edicts, injunctive
in nature, by which the Praetordirected one or both of the parties
to take or refrain from taking certain actions. For example, the
Praetormight have ordered the restoration of land taken by force,
noninterference with the continued peaceful possession of land, the
production of a concealed slave, or one party to allow another to
collect acorns, which had fallen from his trees onto the former's
land. 132 In some cases the Praetorissued provisional or conditional
judgments or provisional commands on an ex parte statement by
33
the plaintiff.
The interdict has been compared to the Anglo-American remedy
of ex parte injunction.'3 4 This remedy is available if the plaintiff
fears that irreparable damage will be done to him if the defendant
is not immediately prevented from doing the act that he finds
objectionable. The defendant's counsel can be heard if he wishes,
but neither side will be heard fully and the judge does not form
more than a general impression as to the merits of the case. Of
course this kind of injunction is not final because it is not meant
to settle the position of the parties.' 31 The similarity of this remedy
and the procedure surrounding it to the interim order of protection
is readily apparent. The purpose of both is to prevent irreparable
damage to the interest of the parties before the court has had a
chance to decide on jurisdiction. Neither is intended to settle with
finality the question of merits or the question of jurisdiction, and
both amount to an order to one or both of the parties to perform
or refrain from performing acts that will prejudice the parties'
rights.
It is significant to this discussion that the Anglo-American remedy of injunction is historically derived from courts of equity,
which were said to act in personam.' 3 ' In other words, equity courts
131.
132.
rett ed.
133.
134.
135.
136.

J. CAMPBELL, A. COMPENDIUM OF ROMAN LAW 149 (2d ed. 1892).
Thomas, Roman Law in AN INTRODUCTION TO LErAL SYSTEMS, 24-25 (Der1968).
Supra note 131 at 160.
J. AUSTIN, LEcTURE ON JURISPRUDENCE 298-99 (Students' Edition 1899).
H. HANBURY, MODERN EQurry, 564 (8th ed. 1962).
F. MAITLAND, EQurry, 322 (2d ed. Reprinted 1949).
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acted on the person to compel him to do or cease doing certain acts,
to compel him to hold property for the benefit of another, or to
compel him to perform obligations. It is also interesting that in
Anglo-American law another power involving jurisdiction solely
over the person, that of subpoena, which can be exercised over
nonlitigants, had its roots in equity. 37
Like the Roman Praetor,the Anglo-American court of equity did
not have immediate jurisdiction over property."' Its decrees took
the form of personal decrees. Therefore, persons were the objects
and property the subject matter of its jurisdiction. 3 9 The court had
no jurisdiction unless the persons to whom its orders were addressed were within reach of the court or otherwise amenable to its
jurisdiction.1 0 Although courts of equity and courts of law have
merged in most jurisdictions, the remedy of injunction subsists
and is still based on jurisdiction rationepersonae."I
The provisional remedy in Anglo-American law is called an "interlocutory injunction." A man who comes to the court for an
interlocutory injunction is not required to make out a case that will
entitle him to relief at all events. If he shows that he has a fair
question to raise as to the existence of the right that he alleges and
he can satisfy the court that the status quo ought to be preserved
until the question can be disposed of, he will succeed.'
The relationship between injunction and jurisdiction ratione
personae is recognized as well in the United States:
If a state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it may likewise render a judgment through its courts which directs him either
to do an act or then pay money to the plaintiff or to refrain from
doing an act. Judgments of this sort are commonly rendered in
equitable proceedings ....
Where such a basis [for the exercise of personal jurisdiction]
exists, the state is said to have jurisdiction in personam and the
proceeding is said to be a proceeding in personam,
137. Id. at 5.
138. W. KERR, A
139. Id.

TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS

(1878).

140. Id. at 8.
141. Hospital for Sick Children v. Walt Disney Productions Inc., [1964] Ch.
52, 69 (C.A.); [1967] 1 ALL E.R. 1005, 1016 (Ch.)
142. Supra note 138 at 12.

143.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 79 at 103 (1971).
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Civil Law countries make no distinction between law and equity;
they do, however, have provisional remedies, similar to the remedy
of interdict, which are generally brought in the court that has
jurisdiction ratione personae over the defendant. The German
remedy is the Einstweilige Verffigung,4 which is a form of interim
order used to prevent a threatened change of existing conditions,
which "may render impossible or substantially more difficult the
realization of one of the parties." ' The order can only be made by
the court where the principal proceedings should be filed,"4 and
this is the court which has jurisdiction over the defendant."
Chapter 15, section 3 of the Swedish Code of Civil Procedure
provides:
If a party to a pending action has shown good ground to support his
claim and it can reasonably be expected that the adverse party by
carrying on a certain activity, or performing or refraining from performing a certain act, or by any other conduct, will prevent or render
difficult execution of an anticipated judgment, or diminish substantially its value for the claimant the court may direct the adverse
party on penalty of a fine, to perform or refrain from performing an
act . .. 1
Again the remedy is described in terms of an order to the party and
is dependent on the court's power over him.
The French possessory remedy for the prevention of interference
with or disturbance of possession is called complainte.149 It is not
specifically mentioned in the Code Civile, which does not distinguish among the various possessory remedies, but it is generally
recognized to be identical with the Roman interdict. 150 Provisional
remedies are called m~sures provisoires.15 The procedure most re144. ZPO § 936 et seq.
145. Supra note 85, Vol. 1, at 273.
146. Id. at 277. In cases of urgency, however, a departure is allowed from this
rule to the extent of permitting the proceedings to be brought at the situs of the
asset under dispute.
147. See discussion in text supra at 12.
148. See note 77 supra, Rattengangsbalk ch. 15, § 3.
149.

A. ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF CONTIrNTAL Cvim PRocEnuRu 772 (1928).

150. Id. at 740.
151. 2 M. DAVID, LE Daorr FRCAms 259 (1960). The provisional remedy has
spread beyond Western Europe. In Japan it is called Provisional Disposition and
it has existed since 1929. A. VON MEHREN,

LAW IN JAPA

49, 465 (1963).
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sembling a request for an interlocutory injunction is the r~ftr6
procedure " 2 in which parties may, in all urgent matters, make
This application may
application to a single judge sitting en rfr.
be made independently of any pending action, and the relief
granted is made without prejudice to the final decision. This action
must be brought in the court of the defendant's domicile and is
based on jurisdiction ratione personae."3 Thus, in municipal legal
systems, which have provisional possessory remedies similar to the
interim measure of protection with the international legal system,
the remedies are normally based on jurisdiction rationepersonae.
In the case of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, where jurisdiction is based on consent, such consent is expressed by means of membership in the United Nations and the
duties expressed in article 94 of the Charter or by means of adherence to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The underlying principle in the minds of those who drafted the Court's
Statute was that a state, in order to have access to the Court, must
have undertaken an obligation toward other parties to the Statute
to respect and carry out the Court's decisions. In other words,
states parties to the Statute have agreed to endow the Court with
some basic judicial authority over them, and the power to indicate
interim measures of protection is inherent in this authority regardless of whether the Court has finally determined that it has jurisdiction ratione materiae under article 36.
Judge Gros, in his dissent in the Nuclear Tests Cases objects
that:
[t]he Court, by putting off the decision on the effects of nonappearance, embraced the proposition that a request for provisional
measures is utterly independent in relation to the case which is the
subject of the application.
It is no use referring to certain domestic systems of law which
feature such independence, because the Court has its own rules of
procedure and must apply them in its jurisdictional system, which
as a corollary of a certain kind of international society has been
established on the basis of the voluntary acceptance of jurisdiction."4
152. C. PRo. Civ. arts. 806-11.
153. Supra, note 71, at 65.
154.

Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 119-20.
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As mentioned above, however, the opinion of Judge Gros does not
appear to manifest an awareness of the difference between jurisdiction rationepersonae and jurisdiction ratione materiae.
The I.C.J. rules of procedure 5 ' seem to indicate, contrary to the
assertion of Judge Gros, that interim protection is quite distinct
from preliminary objections to jurisdiction. They are dealt with in
two separate articles: article 66 deals with interim protection and
article 67 deals with preliminary objections. Article 66(1) provides:
"A request for the indication of interim measures of protection
may be filed at any time during the proceedings in the case in
connection with which it is made. The request shall specify the
case to which it relates, the rights to be protected and the measures
of which indication is proposed." There is no provision in the rules
to the effect that the request shall specify the grounds for jurisdiction ratione materiae or even that the Court shall first satisfy itself
that it has jurisdiction. Furthermore article 66(2) specifies: "A
request for the indication of interim measures of protection shall
have priority over all other cases. The decision thereon shall be
treated as a matter of urgency." That priority and urgency are
referred to in article 66 and that it is placed before the article on
preliminary objections-article 67-indicates that interim protection is to be decided upon before a full determination by the Court
of the issue of jurisdiction.
The courts of the various legal systems, discussed above, do not
totally exclude subject matter from consideration in granting provisional orders. Certainly when an order en r~ftr6 is sought before
a Tribunal Commercial regarding a matrimonial dispute, the application will be dismissed. The same would apply when the application before the Amtgericht is clearly outside the class of disputes
enumerated in Part III supra. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice is not as different from jurisdiction
in these municipal systems as Judge Gros suggests. As in these
systems, the jurisdictional system of the International Court of
Justice permits the granting of interim orders of protection, except
when the claim of jurisdiction under article 36 is manifestly illfounded.' 0
155. Published in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 215-16 (1973).
156. Such a situation might occur in a case in which the Respondent had not
accepted the compulsory clause and the Applicant can point to no special agree-
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THE EFFECT OF FRANCE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
COURT'S ORDER

If article 36 is the only basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to
indicate interim orders of protection, then an order founded only
on the prima facie applicability of that article may be said to be
only provisionally valid and would appear to raise a duty of compliance only retroactively once the Court has finally and definitively declared itself to have jurisdiction. As argued above, however, the jurisdictional basis for an interim order is article 93 of the
United Nations Charter. Therefore, the order raises an immediate
duty of compliance under article 94(1) of the Charter.
Admittedly, nuclear tests are a very sensitive issue although the
tests are not nearly as vital to France as the fisheries are to the
Icelanders. Moreover, it is doubtful that either the French or the
Icelanders will, upon discovering that they have a duty under article 94 of the Charter, be impelled to enter their respective cases to
contest the jurisdiction of the Court (although this writer commends this course of action to them). In the first place it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that they will fail to concur with
this writer's analysis. In the second place article 94(2) is the only
section of the Charter dealing with failure to comply with an order
of the Court. It provides: "If any party to a case fails to perform
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by
the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."
It is doubtful that recourse to the Security Council is likely to
concern France very greatly, since its status as a permanent member of the Security Council and its consequent veto power renders
it immune to any initiative in that direction.
France's recent renunciation of compulsory jurisdiction under
article 36(2) of the Court's Statute is to be regretted, but it need
not concern us here because it is settled law that renunciation of
compulsory jurisdiction does not affect any proceedings before the
Court at the time of the renunciation. 57 Nevertheless, the refusal
ment or treaty upon which it could possibly found a claim of jurisdiction ratione
materiae.

157. See, The Right of Passage over Indian Territory Case (Preliminary
Objections), [1957] I.C.J. 125, 151, 152. See also article 45(5) of the General Act
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
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of France to participate in the proceedings on the ground that lack
of jurisdiction is manifest is part of a growing trend among States
to autointerpret the question of jurisdiction in violation of article
36(6) of the Statute of the Court, which provides: "In the event of
a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court." This trend is further
evidenced by the refusal of Iceland to participate in the Fisheries
JurisdictionCases on the same ground and the refusal of India to
participate in the case of the Trial of PakistaniPrisonersof War. "I
Attempts to autointerpret the jurisdiction of the Court are not
unprecedented. Previously attempts to evade the spirit of article
36(6) have come in the form of self-judging reservations to the
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2). Generally these take the form of being explicitly self-judging. The International Court of Justice dealt with just such an explicitly selfjudging reservation in the Norwegian Loans Case."' In that case,
France filed an application instituting proceedings against Norway
to require that Government to discharge its obligations to the purchasers of certain bonds issued by it, by payment in gold value as
required on the face of the bonds, i.e. the gold value of the coupons
on the date of payment and the gold value of the redeemed bonds
on the date of repayment. The obligation of the Bank of Norway
to convert notes to gold was suspended in 1931 by a statute still in
force at the time of the action.
Both France and Norway had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The declaration filed by
Norway, the defendant, on November 16, 1946, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, that is to say on the basis of reciprocity. The declaration filed by the plaintiff, France, on March
1, 1946, contained an explicitly self-judging reservation: "This declaration does not apply to differences relating to matters which are
essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the
Government of the French Republic."'
The Norwegian Government filed four preliminary objections.
158. See, I.C.J. Communique No. 73/35 (15 December 1973) (dropping that
case from the list of cases before the Court).
159. [19571 I.C.J. 9.
160. [1957] I.C.J. 9, 21.
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The first was to the effect that "[tjhe subject of the dispute as
defined in the application of the French Government of July 6th
1955 is within the domain of municipal law and not of international law, whereas the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in
relation to the parties involved is restricted by their Declarations
of November 16, 1946 and March 1st 1946, to disputes concerning
international law.""' ' Other objections related to jurisdiction
ratione temporis, legal personality, and nonexhaustion of local
remedies.
The Court saw the first objection as consisting of two parts: the
first maintaining that the subject of the dispute was within the
exclusive domain of the municipal law of Norway, the second part
relying upon the French reservations quoted above. Confining its
decisions to an examination of the first Norwegian objection, the
Court held that the two declarations were made on the condition
of reciprocity and that "[s]ince two unilateral declarations are
involved, such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the
extent to which the [two] Declarations coincide in conferring
it." '

Moreover, since the French declaration is the narrower one,

the Court felt that it was the French declaration that must control
even though France was the plaintiff in the case.
Since the first part of the Norwegian preliminary objections asserted that the matter was within the Norwegian domestic jurisdiction, it was a matter essentially within the national jurisdiction
as understood by the Norwegian Government. Accordingly, the
Court declined to hear the merits of the case on the ground that it
lacked jurisdiction. Having accepted the first preliminary objection of Norway, the Court did not feel it was necessary to examine
the other three. What is more important, however, the Court declined to review the validity of the reservation on the ground that
neither party had raised the question of validity. It was a French
reservation, and the French Government did not see fit to abandon
its own reservation. (Perhaps France might have been estopped
from raising the question of validity.) The Norwegian Government,
however, relied upon it.'
161. [1957] I.C.J. 9, 21.
162. [1957] I.C.J. 9, 23.
163. The better view is that the condition of reciprocity is explicitly laid down
and necessarily involved in the system by virtue of article 36(2), which provides
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It was precisely this failure of the Court to examine the validity
of the French declaration that Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht objected to in his separate opinion. 64 He felt that the French declaration was invalid because it was contrary to article 36(6) of the
Statute of the Court:
[w]hat would be the position if in accepting-or purporting to accept-the obligations of Article 36 of the Statute, a state were to
exclude the operation of paragraph 6 of that Article not only with
regard to one reservation but with regard to all reservations or,
generally, with regard to any disputed question of the jurisdiction
of the Court? What would be the position if the Declarations were
to make it a condition that oral proceedings of the Court shall be
secret; or that its Judgment shall not be binding unless given by
unanimity or that it should contain no reasons; or that no Dissenting
Opinion shall be attached; or that Judges of certain nationality shall
be excluded; or that contrary to what is said in Article 38 of its
Statute, the Court shall apply only treaties and custom ....
It might be said that some of these examples are hypothetical and
farfetched. In fact they are far less farfetched than the particular
instance here discussed, the instance of a reservation according to
which a Government claims . . . the right to determine for itself
whether the Court has jurisdiction . . . . [W]hile the Statute as

interpreted in practice permits reservations to its jurisdiction it does
not permit reservations as to the functioning and organization of the
Court.
Clearly the Court cannot act otherwise than in accordance with
its own statute."5
According to Judge Lauterpacht, since the French declaration was
invalid it was incapable of producing legal consequences. The
Court in upholding the Norwegian objection based upon that reservation was endowing the reservation with legal consequences that
it did not possess and, thereby, implicitly upholding it.
Judge Lauterpacht also discussed the possible ways of handling
that the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction extends only "in relation to any
other state accepting the same obligation .... .
It would appear that the statement "on condition of reciprocity" in declarations
accepting the optional clause is superfluous. A. FAcmi, PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 96-97 (2d ed. 1932).
164. [1957] I.C.J. 9, 34-66 (Lauterpacht).
165. [1957] I.C.J. 9, 44-45.
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such a reservation. The first possibility was that the Court could
either sever the words "as understood by the French Government"
from the reservation or it could sever the reservation from the rest
of the declaration. Both of these courses Judge Lauterpacht rejected, saying that the reservation, as qualified, was the "essence
of the undertaking." '66 The possibility that the Court might invalidate the particular reservation which is deemed objectionable was
rejected by Judge Lauterpacht almost out of hand. The reservation, he claimed, was the essence of the undertaking, and to treat
it as invalid would mean that the entire reservation of matters of
national jurisdiction would be treated as invalid while the declaration of acceptance would be treated as fully in force. This would
also result in a ruling that the Court has jurisdiction since Norway
could not rely on the invalid declaration in its objection.' 7 Hence,
the only course that the Court should have taken, according to
Judge Lauterpacht, was to consider the entire acceptance tainted
with invalidity and decline jurisdiction on the ground that there
was no valid declaration of acceptance on the part of the French
Government."'
One is not bound to accept Judge Lauterpacht's view that the
Court had implicitly recognized the validity of the French selfjudging reservation. Had Judge Lauterpacht arrived at a result
different from that of the Court it might perhaps be assumed that
the Court had rejected the contention that the declaration was
invalid. As it is, it can only be said that Judge Lauterpacht and
the Court reached the same result albeit by different routes. In the
Interhandel case both Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht' 9 and Judge
Sir Percy Spender'70 objected to the validity of a United States selfjudging reservation. In this case the United States, as defendant,
actually raised the reservation in objecting to jurisdiction. However, the Court evaded the issue by deciding on other grounds that
it had no jurisdiction. Judge Read argued in the Norwegian Loans
case that the French reservation could be construed as leaving the
Court the power to determine whether the French view on domes166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

[1957]
[1957]
[1957]
[1959]
[1959]

I.C.J.
I.C.J.
I.C.J.
I.C.J.
I.C.J.

9, 57.
9, 57.
9, 36.
95 (Lauterpacht).
54 (Spender).
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tic jurisdiction is reasonable.171 Judge Spender, in Interhandel,"2

complained that this view would constitute an unwarranted
amendment of the reservation. But Judge Read's argument can be
used to demonstrate the weakness of Judge Lauterpacht's position.
So long as there exists a verbal provision capable of an interpretation that leaves a residuum of decision making authority to the
Court, it would not be proper to say that it ipso facto has the effect
of excluding article 36(6). Until it is established that it does have
that effect it cannot be said- that the reservation, much less the
whole declaration, is invalid. What can be done is what the Court
did-hold that a State that accepts compulsory jurisdiction on the
basis of reciprocity is equally entitled to rely on that reservation.
The French "self-defense" reservation is a reservation that is not
self-judging by its own terms. However, there appears to be an
issue whether it is implicitly self-judging. The French Government
claimed that it is self-evident that the defense reservation excludes
from the jurisdiction of the Court the question of whether atmospheric nuclear tests were illegal."' Mr. Ellicott, the SolicitorGeneral of Australia, argued for Australia that "in any event the
mere existence of the French reservation, upon the assumption
that it has an objectively definable content, cannot be taken as
creating a situation in which the court is now manifestly without
jurisdiction under Article 36(2). .... 174 If, however, the selfdefense reservation was to be regarded as self-judging, Mr. Ellicott
contended that it was void as being contrary to the fundamental
policy of the Statute of the Court. For authority on this point he
relied on the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the
Norwegian Loans case and the opinions of Judges Lauterpacht,
5
Spender, Klaestad and Armand Ugon in the Interhandel caseY.1
The Court accepted Mr. Ellicott's view as indicating that a dispute over jurisdiction existed:
Whereas in its oral observations the Government of Australia maintains inter alia . . .that if the reservation in paragraph 3 of the
171.
172.
173.
35.
174.
175.

[1957] I.C.J. 9, 93.
[19591 I.C.J. 54, 58.
See Verbatim Record of Australian Case, Public Sitting 21 May 1973, at
Id. at 37.
Id.
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French declaration of 20 May 1966 relating to "disputes concerning
activities connected with the national defence" is to be regarded as
one having an objective content, it is questionable whether nuclear
weapon development falls within the concept of national defence;
that if this reservation is to be regarded as a self-judging reservation,
it is invalid, and in consequence France is bound by the terms of
that declaration unqualified by the reservation in question; ... 76
Mr. Ellicott further pointed out that the judges divided equally
on the question of severability of one invalid reservation from the
declaration. He might have added that, in determining whether
the self-defense reservation is severable, the Court need not be
bound by the opinions of Judges Lauterpacht and Spender on the
severability of the "domestic jurisdiction" reservation since the
"self-defense reservation" appears to be far less the "essence" of
the overall undertaking.
But is the argument necessary at all? The defense reservation,
as pointed out above, is not self-judging by its own terms. It is selfjudging only if the Court accepts the view that France is thereby
endowed with such an unlimited margin of appreciation as to what
its defense needs are that the matter is incapable of subjective
assessment by anyone else. This is basically what the French Government is claiming by its assertion that the Court is manifestly
without jurisdiction. This view appears to have the concurrence of
Judge Forster,' 77 and Judge Ignacio-Pinto17 1 Other judges in the
minority, as previously noted, 79 have refrained from addressing
themselves to the validity or meaning of the defense reservation,
being more concerned with the extent to which jurisdiction needs
to be proved in order to ground an interim order. The majority do
not appear to agree that France has an unlimited margin of appreciation.
Nevertheless, the power to determine the extent of the margin
of appreciation that France has under the defense reservation, resides with the Court and to this extent the self-defense reservation
is wholly consonant with article 36(6) of the Statute. Thus there
is a fundamental distinction between explicitly self-judging reser176.
177.
178.
179.

Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 102.
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 112-13 (Forster).
Australia v. France, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 129-30 (Pinto).
See notes 166-72 and accompanying text, supra.
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vations and reservations that may be implicitly self-judging. Consequently, the better argument seems to be that the contents of the
self-defense reservation are capable of objective determination and
that the reservation does not leave France with the margin of appreciation that it claims for itself.
What is more serious, however, is the conduqct of France in ignoring the order of the Court. This conduct may be designated as selfjudgifig conduct. Although the words of a reservation, even one
that appears to be explicitly self-judging, 8 ' may be read and interpreted in a manner consistent with article 36(6), one cannot, however, read down conduct. The Court issued an order; France appears to have ignored it, asserting as the basis for its action the
Court's lack of jurisdiction. The Court has thus been deprived
unilaterally by France of the power to determine whether it has
jurisdiction. There are no words that the Court can look at to
determine whether a residuum of decision making power is left to
it, as this writer has suggested is the case with the "domestic
jurisdiction" reservation. 81 Thus, there is nothing more unequivocally self-judging than self-judging conduct. It is clearly a violation
of article 36(6). Since there is no possibility that any residuum of
decision making authority is being left to the Court, the weakness
of Judge Lauterpacht's argument, which has been previously discussed, does not apply.
France's self-judging conduct constituted a de facto
renunciation of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The formal renunciation merely ratified an existing position. In ignoring
the interim order, however, France has gone even further than
that. It has also attempted to unilaterally abrogate article 36(6) of
the Court's Statute as it relates to article 36(1) of the Statute and
article 93 of the United Nations Charter. It would seem that
France has totally excluded itself from access to the International
Court of Justice. This would, to this writer, be a viable defense to
any suit that France seeks to bring before the International Court
of Justice in the future and, indeed, against any state, which by
its conduct, attempts a unilateral renunciation of article 36(6).
The success of such a defense would, it is submitted, be consistent
180. See discussion in text of Judge Read's views in the Norwegian Loans
Case, supra at Part VII.
181. See text supra at Part VII.
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with the drafters' intention that the only states to have access to
the Court are those that undertake a duty to abide by its decisions.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to demonstrate that the drafters of
the Statute on which the International Court of Justice is based
intended the Court to be something more than an arbitral tribunal
to which consenting parties submit disputes on an ad hoc basis.
To this end, they endowed the Court with a general jurisdiction
ratione personae over the parties to the Statute and the power to
determine for itself whether it had jurisdiction in each case. In
their scheme the drafters anticipated that those states that agreed
to become parties to the Statute thereby agreed to give the Court
certain basic judicial authority over them. This authority comprehends primarily that the parties to the Court's Statute will undertake to comply with the decision of the Court.
This article has also attempted to demonstrate that in legal
systems, derived from Roman law, the power of courts to indicate
provisional measures to preserve the status quo between parties is
based primarily on jurisdiction rationepersonae and that the drafters of the Court's Statute recognized the similarity between interim protection and Roman interdict and intended that jurisdiction to order interim protection should also be based on jurisdiction ratione personae. Lately, the Court in dealing with applications for interim protection has placed too much emphasis on articles 36 and 37, which relate largely to jurisdiction rationemateriae.
In doing so it has undermined the legal authority upon which the
duty to comply with such an order is based. As a consequence, the
Court's authority has been severely shaken by the refusal of states
to comply with its last three interim orders. Furthermore, France's
renunciation of compulsory jurisdiction may have finally squashed
any impulse that the Court may have had toward judicial valor.
The extent of the Court's power to determine its own jurisdiction
may be further clarified in the jurisdiction phase of the Nuclear
Tests Cases by the extent of the margin of appreciation that the
Court is willing to grant to France to determine whether nuclear
warfare is connected with self-defense. However, it certainly seems
that at this time article 36(2) notwithstanding, the Court has no
power to adjudicate any case that the parties have not consented,
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on an ad hoc basis, to submit to it. This is a far cry from the
confidence expressed by the drafters in 1920 that compulsory jurisdiction was an idea whose time had come. It may be that in a world
of sovereign, independent states, compulsory jurisdiction is simply
not feasible; yet it is not amiss for scholars to point out the nature
of the legal norms to which states purport to. subscribe.
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